

PLSC 380E - Strategy in International Politics

Tuesday and Thursday: 6 PM to 7:25 PM

Fall 2008

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Office Hours: Tuesday and Thursday : 3:30 PM to 5:30 PM and by appointment

Introduction: State behavior and interstate interaction is strategic - states' and implicitly decision makers' actions and foreign policy choices depend upon the expected behavior of other actors. In this class, we will explore the strategic approach to studying state behavior and interaction. We will study how strategic interaction – domestic, interstate and with non-state actors - has an effect on crises initiation, duration and termination; alliance formation; transitional justice; trade and on participation within international institutions.

The first part of the course will lay out the foundations for understanding the strategic approach to world politics. More specifically, we will examine and evaluate the assumptions and the methodological tools that lie at the heart of theoretical models that use this approach. Particular attention will be given to the basics of game theory, which is a mathematical tool used extensively to understand strategic interaction. Prior exposure to game theory is not a requirement. Being comfortable with basic algebra and probabilities is however desirable. The second part of the course will survey the various models of strategic interaction in the literature. Special attention will be given to models that examine the effect of domestic political actors and structures on state interaction.

Readings: This is a reading and writing heavy class. Students are expected to come to class prepared, participate in discussions and to exhibit advanced college-level writing capabilities. It is therefore imperative for each of you to finish the required readings before the class. Not doing the readings is reflected on the quality and quantity of your participation and it is very easy to separate the students who have done the readings and those who have not. So do the readings before you come to class.

The following books are required for this class. These are available for purchase in the bookstore or online. You must have a copy of the text when it is being discussed in class.

- American Political Science Association. 2001. *Style Manual for Political Science*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books/Perseus.
- Lake, David A. and Robert Powell. 1999. *Strategic Choice in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Powner, Leanne, C. and Scott Bennett. 2005. *Applying the Strategic Perspective: Problems and Models*.
- Roselle, Laura and Sharon Spray. 2008. *Research and Writing in International Relations*. New York: Pearson.
- Schelling, Thomas C. 1980. *The Strategy of Conflict*. New York: Harvard University Press.
- Stein, Arthur. 1990. *Why Nations Cooperate? Circumstance and Choice in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

In addition to the above required books, the following case studies are also required reading for the class. Copies of the cases are available at the **Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy**. The link for the student website is - <http://www.guisd.org/>. Through this website, you can either order paper or online

copies of the case studies. Following are the cases that you will need to purchase:

- **Case 101.** Crawford, Beverly. NATO Alliance Negotiations over the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions.
- **Case 216.** Tarry, Scott. Bailing Out USAir: Balancing Domestic and Foreign Economic Interests.
- **Case 231.** Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War?
- **Case 301.** Harrison, Michael M. and Mark G. McDonough. Negotiations on the French Withdrawal from NATO.
- **Case 453.** Bjork, James E. and Allan E. Goodman. Yugoslavia, 1991-92: Could Diplomacy Have Prevented a Tragedy?
- **Case 460.** Williams, Abiodun. In Search of Peace: Negotiations to End the Angolan Civil War
- **Case 514.** Dallmeyer, Dorinda G. The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions, Negotiations, and the Decision to Go to War.
- **Case 519.** Mistry, Dinshaw . India's Nuclear Tests: The Consequences for International Security.

In addition to the required books and cases, several journal and book articles will be assigned. The journal articles can be accessed through the **MetaLINK application** on the library website. Articles and book chapters that are not readily available online will be posted on BB under the course documents section. It is also recommended that you familiarize yourself with scholar.google.com. This is a search engine for academic sources including books and journal articles. If you are using the BU server, you should be able to use this search engine to link to articles in the BU library website.

Contacting the Instructor: Please feel free to contact me if you have questions about readings, assignments, grading or the course in general. The best way to get in touch with me is through email. As a rule, I respond to emails within 24 hours of receiving them (except on weekends and over university breaks, when you will have to be a little more patient). If I have not responded to your email within 24 hours, it is more than likely that I have not received your email. In such case, please either speak to me in person or resend your email.

Grading: You must complete all requirements for the class in order to get a passing grade. No extra credit assignments, extensions for deadlines or incompletes will be given unless supporting documents for a sudden personal emergency are provided. If you wish to contest a grade, please do so in writing and not before 72 hours of receiving the grade. In order to contest the grade, you will be required to write a paragraph justifying why you think the grade you received was not reflective of the quality of work that you submitted. This paragraph has to be typed and turned in as a hard copy to the instructor along with the original graded assignment. The breakdown of the final grade along with the deadlines for all assignments are as follows:

Area news presentation and compilation	10%	List to be posted on BB no later than 7pm Saturday
Participation	15%	Participation in every seminar
Assignments and surprise quizzes	15%	Assignments due in class as specified in the syllabus or by the instructor
Reaction papers (4)	20%	Posted on BB no later than 5pm the day before reading is due in seminar. All students are required to read the reaction papers in addition to the readings for the day and incorporate the papers in their discussion in class.
Leading discussion and presentation	10%	
Mid term exam	10%	
Final research paper and presentation	20%	
Attendance	Mandatory	

Attendance: Attendance is critical for doing well in class. While I will not be taking attendance, missing classes

will affect your performance - you will lose participation and quiz points, as well as miss important material that might appear on tests and might not be in the readings, but is discussed in class. While the desire to do well should be enough of an incentive to attend all classes, sometimes external mechanisms need to be exerted in order to make "defection" i.e. not attending classes prohibitively expensive. There will therefore be pop/surprise quizzes during the course of the semester.

Area Expert Groups: Groups will be randomly assigned to a specific region during the second seminar meeting. Each Group will present foreign policy related news (restrict yourself to no more than 3 to 4 headlines per region) of the past few days to the class. At the end of the week, each group will compile a list of headlines and post it on the discussion board with appropriate citations. The purpose of this exercise is to not only familiarize yourself with a specific region and the overarching foreign policy and international politics related problems and concerns that the region faces, but also to familiarize yourself with the major news sources for different regions. You will also learn how to cite various forms of news sources using the appropriate APSA form citation. ***A single grade will be assigned to the entire group.***

Participation: Participation is mandatory. This is a seminar and merely attending class will not count as participation. Participation will be graded along the following rubric:

F: Did not participate at all or made comments, questions that were irrelevant to the topic/ readings or were not insightful. Neither did the student make an effort to meet the instructor during office hours in order to discuss participation problems.

D-C: Participated in fewer than 10 classes or made comments, questions on irrelevant topics or merely summarized the readings. Made some effort to meet the instructor and discuss problems with participation.

B: Participated in most classes, but did not make/ ask insightful comments/ questions all the time.

A: Participated in all classes and made meaningful comments and asked insightful questions that encouraged discussion and increased the student's own understanding of the reading material and the topic at hand as well as the understanding of the class.

Leading Discussion: Each of the Area Expert Groups will also act as discussion leaders once after the mid term exam. Each group will have to prepare a set of questions, enough to run discussion for an hour and half, and post them on BB no later than 1 pm the previous day. In class, you and your group members will present an overview of the readings for the day. You and your group partner(s) will also conduct the discussion for the day. ***A single grade will be assigned to the entire group.*** You will be able to sign up for your preferred days to lead by the second week of classes. Keep in mind that this is separate from the participation component for the class.

Short reaction papers: You will be required to write four short response/ reaction papers (2-3 pages) on readings after the mid term exam. You can choose any day you like to write your response paper (including the day your lead discussion). You will however need to sign up for your preferred days by the second week of classes. In order to do so, please send me an email with your top five choices ASAP. I will then assign the four days you will have to write a reaction paper on. If you have never written a reaction paper, it would be prudent to come and talk with me or ask me in class.

Final paper and presentation: As a final project, each of you will be required to turn in a final research paper (no more than 15-20 pages). We will be talking more about this project in class at an appropriate time.

Turnitin: All papers, including short papers, and the final paper need to be posted on turnitin. You will find the

turnitin link on BB. Deadlines for turnitin will be the same as the deadlines for posting the papers online or turning in the hard copies, whichever is earlier. It is therefore, advisable that you post the turnitin copy before you turn in the hard copy of the assignment. Papers will not be graded until they have been posted on turnitin and turned in as hard copies.

Academic Integrity and Citations: Your work must be your own. If you quote, use or build your arguments upon the ideas or work of others (whether written or oral), you are expected to quote them and/ or give them explicit credit. In case of failure to do so, the penalties will be severe, ranging from a failure in the course to suspension. Students caught cheating or plagiarizing will receive a failing grade for the class, however insignificant the problem might be. Remember, such an academic misconduct is also recorded in your transcripts. If you are not sure how to cite sources or what constitutes plagiarism, please come and talk to me – it is not worth the risk!

For the purpose of this class, you will be required to use the American Political Science Association form citations. The APSA citation manual is a required text and it is advisable that you use it extensively.

Deadlines: Adhering to deadlines is important. Treat being in class as a job – you would not miss a deadline if you were working. I enforce strict deadlines both for hard copies and for turnitin uploads on BB. Any delay after the stipulated deadline will be penalized as follows:

A minute to an hour after the deadline:	Half a grade point penalty
An hour to 5 hours after the deadline:	One grade point penalty
5 hours to 24 hours after the deadline:	Two grade point penalty
Beyond 24 hours:	A failing grade unless documentation for a personal emergency, including illness is submitted.

Papers and assignments will not be graded unless the hard copy of the paper is turned in on time, even if they have been posted online. Submissions through email will not be accepted.

Note about the syllabus: This is a live syllabus and is bound to change. You will be informed about any changes in the syllabus, assignments, grading requirements and readings via your Binghamton email. Any information about changes to the syllabus will also be posted on BlackBoard (**BB**). It is your responsibility to ensure that a) your Binghamton email is live and b) you check BB constantly for any updates.

Reading list	
Tuesday, August 26	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meet and Greet • Careful reading of the syllabus • Introduction to the class
Thursday, August 28	Evaluating Theory.
Questions for discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is theory? • Why do we need theory? • The need for assumptions in theory. • How to evaluate theories.
Readings	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moore, Will H. "Evaluating Theory in Political Science." unpublished paper. (on BB) <p>Recommended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geddes, Barbara. 1990. How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics." Political Analysis. (on BB)
Assignment	Survey and the academic integrity forms due.
Tuesday, September 2	The rational choice assumptions
Questions for discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the rationality assumption? • What is instrumental rationality? • How "realistic" is the rationality assumption?
Readings	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McCubbins, Mathew D., and Michael F. Thies. 1996. "Gourisei to jisshou shugi seiji riron no kiso [Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory]." Rebaiasan [Leviathan] 19(Autumn):7-32. (on BB) • Shepsle, Kenneth and Mark S. Bonachek. Analyzing Politics. Chapter 2. (on BB) • Morton, Rebecca. Methods and Models. Chapter 3. (on BB)
Assignment	<i>Powner, Chapter 2 due.</i>
Thursday, September 4	The rational choice assumptions (continued)
Assignment	<i>Citation Assignment due in class.</i>
Tuesday, September 9	The rational choice assumption Where do preferences come from?
Readings	<p>Required</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frieden. "Actors and Preferences in International Relations." in Lake & Powell. • Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," <i>International Organization</i>. 51(4): 513-553.
Thursday, September 11	The rational choice assumptions continued The role of information and perceptions
Readings	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," <i>International Organization</i>. 59(4): 77-106. • Stein. Why Nations Cooperate. Chapter 3

Assignment	<i>Powner, Chapter 9 due.</i>
Tuesday, September 16	Basics of game theory
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dixit and Skeath. Games of Strategy. Chapters 1 and 2. (on BB) • Gates, Scott and Brian D. Humes. Games, Information and Politics. Chapter 1. Modeling with games. (on BB)
Thursday, September 18	Basics of game theory continued
Assignment	Assignment due. Assignment will be posted on BB
Tuesday, September 23	Basics of game theory Sequential games
Thursday, September 25	Mid term Exam
Tuesday, September 30	No Class University break
Thursday, October 2	Rational Choice, Game Theory and International Politics
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Walt, Stephen. 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." <i>International Security</i>. 23(4): 5-48. • Powell, Robert. 1999. "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies." <i>International Security</i>. 4(2): 97-106. • Milner, Helen V. 1998. "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics." <i>International Organization</i>. 52(4): 759-786. • Chapter 1, Lake and Powell. • Stein. Why Nations Cooperate. Chapter 1.
Tuesday, October 7	Strategy and Bargaining
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abhinay Muthoo. 2000. "A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory." <i>World Economics</i>. 1(2): 145-166. • Schelling. Strategy of Conflict. • Lake and Powell. Chapter 3.
Thursday, October 9	No class
Tuesday, October 14	War as a bargaining problem.
	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." <i>International Organization</i>. 49 (3): 379-414.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." <i>International Organization</i>. 60(1): 169-203.
Cases	Case 231 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War?
Thursday, October 16	Crisis bargaining and escalation
Readings	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 88(3): 577-592. Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 41(1): 68-90. Morrow, James D. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>. 33(4): 941-972. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, and Ethan R. Zorick. 1997. "Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 91(1): 15-27. <p>Recommended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Powell, Robert. 1987. "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 81(3): 717-736. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1982. "Deterrence and Bargaining." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 26(2): 329-358.
Cases	Case 453 Yugoslavia, 1991-92: Could Diplomacy Have Prevented a Tragedy?
Tuesday, October 21	Interstate Cooperation
	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Axelrod. <i>Evolution of Cooperation</i>. All. Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation." <i>International Organization</i>. 52(2): 269-305. Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>. 43(4): 979-1002. <p>Recommended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." <i>World Politics</i>. 30(2): 167-214. Martin, Lisa L. 1993. "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions." <i>World Politics</i>. 45(3): 406-432. Morrow, James D. 1994. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information." <i>International Organization</i>. 48(3): 387-423.
Cases	Case 101 NATO Alliance Negotiations over the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions.
Thursday, October 23	No Class
Assignment	Watch Dr. Strangelove and write a short paper (around 2 pages) about how the movie is a good example of strategic interaction. Assignment due on Tuesday, October 28.
Tuesday, October 28	Sanctions
Readings	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kaempfer, William H. and Anton D. Lowenberg. 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach" <i>American Economic Review</i>. 78(4):

	<p>786-793.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Martin, Lisa L. 1993. "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions." <i>World Politics</i>. 45(3): 406-432. Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie L. Schwebach. 1997. "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises." <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>. 41: 27-50. • Morrow, James D. 1994. "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information." <i>International Organization</i>. 48(3): 387-423.
Cases	Case 514 The Kuwait Crisis: Sanctions, Negotiations, and the Decision to Go to War.
Thursday, October 30	Alliances
Readings	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow, James D. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 38(2): 270-297. • Olson, Mancur and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. "An Economic Theory of Alliances." <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i>. 48(3): 266-279. • Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." <i>International Studies Quarterly</i>. 39(4): 405-426. • Smith, Alastair. 1996. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 40(1): 16-40. • Stein. <i>Why Nations Cooperate</i>. Chapter 6. <p>Recommended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow, James D. 1993. Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security. <i>International Organization</i>. 47(2): 207-233.
Cases	Case 301 Negotiations on the French Withdrawal from NATO.
Tuesday, November 4	Domestic politics – role of institutions
Cases	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; James D. Morrow; Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 93(4): 791-808. • Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke. 1994. "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>. 38(2): 362-380. • Lake and Powell. Chapter 4. • Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." <i>International Organization</i>. 42(3): 427-460.
Thursday, November 6	Domestic Politics – signaling
Readings	<p>Required:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Morrow, James D. 1993. "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security." <i>International Organization</i>. 47(2): 207-233. • Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. "Do Domestic Institutions Constrain or Inform?: Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." <i>International Organization</i>. 53 (2) :233-266. • Schultz, Kenneth A. 1998. Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 92(4): 829-844. • Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 92(3). 623-639. <p>Recommended"</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." <i>International Organization</i>. 42(3): 427-460. Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 88(3): 577-592. Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 41(1): 68-90.
Cases	Case 216 Bailing Out USAir: Balancing Domestic and Foreign Economic Interests
Tuesday, November 11	Domestic politics continued
Readings	To be added
Assignment	Choose any one article (required or recommended) from the reading list and identify the assumptions.
Thursday, November 13	International Institutions
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. <i>International Organization</i> 55: 761-799 Lake and Powell. Chapter 5.
Tuesday, November 18	Deterrence
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achen, Christopher and Duncan Snidal. 1989. "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." <i>World Politics</i>. 41: 143-169. Fearon, James D. 2002. "Selection Effects and Deterrence." <i>International Interactions</i>. 28(1): 5-29. Powell, Robert. 1987. "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 81(3): 717-736. Powell, Robert. 2003. "Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense." <i>International Security</i>. 27(4): 86-118. Wagner, R. Harrison. 1982. "Deterrence and Bargaining." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 26(2): 329-358.
Cases	Case 519 India's Nuclear Tests: The Consequences for International Security
Thursday, November 20	Intrastate conflict, terrorism and transitional justice
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. "Conciliation, Counter terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence." <i>International Organization</i>. 59(1):145-176. Fearon, James D. 2002. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?" <i>Journal of Peace Research</i>. 41(3): 275-302. Kaminski, Marek M. and Monika Nalepa. 2006. "Judging Transitional Justice: A New Criterion For Evaluating Truth Revelation Procedures." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 50(3): 383-408. Mason, David T. and Patrick J. Fett. 1996. "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach." <i>Journal of Conflict Resolution</i>. 40(4): 546-568. Pape, Robert A. 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." <i>American Political Science Review</i> 97(August):343-361

Cases	Case 460 In Search of Peace: Negotiations to End the Angolan Civil War.
Assignment	Powner, Chapters 10 and 11 due.
Tuesday, November 25	Power transitions
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diehl, Paul F. and Jean Kingston. 1987. "Messenger or Message?: Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict." <i>Journal of Politics</i>. 49(4): 789-799. • Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow. 1992. "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i>. 36 (4):896-922 • Powell, Robert. 1996. "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement." <i>American Political Science Review</i>. 90(4): 749-764. • Stein. <i>Why Nations Cooperate</i>. Chapter 5
Thursday November 27	<u>No class</u>
Tuesday, December 2	Trade
Readings	Required: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gawande, Kishor and Wendy Hansen. 1999. "Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pursuit of Free and Fair Trade." <i>International Organization</i>. 53(1): 117-159. • Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks." <i>Journal of Political Economy</i>. 103(4): 675-708. • Edward D. Mansfield; Helen V. Milner; Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements ." <i>International Organization</i>. 56(3): 477-513.
Thursday, December 4	Wrap up
Readings	Required <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lake and Powell. Chapter 7. • Stein. Chapter 7.
Tuesday, and Thursday, December 9 and 11	In class paper presentations.
Tuesday, December 16	Final papers due